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Preface 
 
The Office of Ombudsman (Ombudsman) is an independent and impartial agency in the 
legislative branch of Iowa state government which investigates complaints against most Iowa 
state and local government agencies.  The governor, legislators, and judges and their staffs fall 
outside the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.  The Ombudsman’s powers and duties are defined in 
Iowa Code chapter 2C. 
 
In any investigation, the Ombudsman aims to determine whether an agency’s actions are 
unlawful, contrary to policy, unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, or otherwise objectionable.  The 
Ombudsman may make recommendations to the agency and other appropriate officials to correct 
a problem or to improve government policies, practices, or procedures.  If the Ombudsman 
determines that a public official has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary 
proceedings, the Ombudsman may refer the matter to the appropriate authorities. 
 
If the Ombudsman decides to publish a report of the investigative findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations, and the report is critical of a specific agency, the agency is given an 
opportunity to reply to the report, and the unedited reply is attached to the report. 
 
Separately from a critical report, the Ombudsman may also issue a special report under Iowa 
Administrative Code 141—2.13 if no specific agency is criticized and the issue is of significant 
public interest.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Background on Professional Licensing Boards 
 
The State of Iowa maintains 36 professional licensing boards that are responsible for regulating 
all manner of trained workers under Iowa Code chapters 147, 272C, and/or 546.
1
  All but four of 
these boards are housed within the Iowa Department of Public Health or the Iowa Division of 
Banking.  Among the more well-known professions licensed under these chapters are doctors, 
chiropractors, real-estate agents, and barbers.  Other agencies that have responsibility for 
licensing and regulating occupations include the Department of Natural Resources, the 
Department of Agriculture, the Department of Public Safety, and the Iowa Judicial Branch.  
Several other licensing boards or agencies also exist under the direction of different chapters of 
the Code.
2
 
 
The ostensible aim of these boards is to protect the public from incompetent or unscrupulous 
practitioners.  Each board is tasked by law with creating minimum education requirements and 
continuing-education protocols for the professions they oversee.  Administrative rules governing 
individual boards often speak of ethical responsibilities, such as treating clients with respect and 
sensitivity, and maintaining their confidences.  State law directs most boards to police individual 
licensees and consider citizen complaints against them to “determine in any case whether an 
investigation … or a disciplinary proceeding is warranted.” 3  If a licensee lacks the proper 
education or experience, or is proven to have committed carelessness, negligence, or intentional 
misdeeds or omissions, these oversight boards are empowered to take actions against them.  
Among the punitive measures contemplated by law are additional training, civil penalties, license 
suspensions, and license revocations.
4
 
 
This disciplinary scheme is necessary “to assure the residents of this state a high standard of 
professional and occupational care,” according to the Code.5 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 These boards are: the Board of Engineering and Land Surveying Examiners; the Board of Examiners of Shorthand 
Reporters; the Iowa Accountancy Examining Board; the Real Estate Commission; the Board of Architectural 
Examiners; the Board of Landscape Architectural Examiners; the Board of Barbering; the Board of Chiropractic; the 
Board of Cosmetology Arts and Sciences; the Dental Board; the Board of Mortuary Science; the Board of Medicine; 
the Board of Physician Assistants; the Board of Nursing; the Board of Nursing Home Examiners; the Board of 
Optometry; the Board of Pharmacy; the Board of Physical and Occupational Therapy; the Board of Podiatry; the 
Board of Psychology; the Board of Speech Pathology and Audiology; the Board of Hearing Aid Dispensers; the 
Board of Veterinary Medicine; the Board of Water Treatment Operators; the Board of Respiratory Care; the Board 
of Athletic Training; the Board of Massage Therapy; the Board of Sign Language Interpreters and Transliterators; 
the Board of Emergency Medical Care Providers and Emergency Medical Care Services; the Plumbing and 
Mechanical Systems Board; the Fire Extinguishing and Alarm System Licensing Advisory Board; the Board of 
Behavioral Science; the Board of Dietetics; the Board of Social Work; the Real Estate Appraiser Examining Board; 
and the Interior Design Examining Board.  
2
 Some of those boards include the Board of Educational Examiners; the Bureau of Radiological Health; the Bureau 
of Substance Abuse; the Electrical Examining Board; the Attorney Disciplinary Board; and the Racing and Gaming 
Commission. 
3
 See Iowa Code § 272C.3(1)(d). 
4
 See Iowa Code § 272C.3 (2). 
5
 See Iowa Code § 272C.3 (2)(b). 
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Complaints to the Ombudsman and Challenges to the Ombudsman’s Authority 
 
Over the past five years, citizens have filed 48 complaints with the Ombudsman against state 
licensing boards.  Some of those complaints involved unreturned phone messages, the timely 
posting of meeting minutes, and concerns about the licensing process, to name a few.  More 
substantive complaints involved close to a dozen different boards.  In all but one of those cases, 
our complainants expressed the same frustration:  Not only had the boards failed to take action 
against the professionals they complained about, but the boards also offered no meaningful 
explanations for their decisions.  
 
We were surprised when we repeatedly ran into the same dead end in our review of these same 
complaints.  Even though the Ombudsman has statutory authority to “examine any and all 
records and documents of any agency” (including confidential records), the boards shared few 
records with us that shed any light on how they arrived at their decisions.  We presumed this 
meant that board members had judged the cases in closed-session meetings not open to the 
public.  So we requested minutes and audio recordings of the closed-session meetings.  The 
boards’ legal representatives—all from the Iowa Attorney General’s office—maintained that our 
office was barred from reviewing these records, despite our authority to review confidential 
records.  Various assistant attorneys general began to argue in early 2012 that closed-session 
records could be released only at the order of a judge.  We disagreed, noting that for years we 
had received such records from other state and local agencies with little or no resistance.
6
    
 
Our attempts to learn details of closed-session discussions through interviews of board members 
also yielded little information.  During one interview, an assistant attorney general advised a 
board member not to offer us specifics on why he and his colleagues had rejected a complaint 
filed against a licensee.  This led us to ask who exactly the boards were accountable to: 
 
Ombudsman:  If we can’t view this, and the complainant can’t view this … who 
has the ability to gauge the effectiveness of this board? 
Board member:  I don’t have an answer to that. 
Ombudsman:  If you don’t have an answer to that, I don’t either.  And what that 
tells me is that the people who file complaints with the board are supposed to take 
on faith that their complaints are getting adequate consideration and are being 
closed appropriately.  Would you agree? 
Board member:  Yes. 
 
Because the boards’ closing communications to complainants say so little, and because Attorney 
General Tom Miller’s office believed the boards’ closed-session records were inaccessible 
without a court order, we were led to conclude that the only mechanism of oversight for the 
boards is the boards themselves.   
 
                                                 
6
 We also believed our position was supported by a 2001 Attorney General opinion that stated closed-session records 
were accessible to investigative agencies with subpoena authority.  The Attorney General’s office argued that the 
opinion should be given a more limited reading.  The opinion focused on whether a member of a governmental 
agency that went into closed session could later access records from the meeting without a court order.  See 2001 
WL 1651411, (Iowa A.G. November 19, 2001). 
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Eventually, lawmakers who heard of our impasse with the Attorney General sponsored and 
passed legislation in 2015 giving us explicit access to all agencies’ closed-session records.  A 
day after the law went into effect, we renewed our requests for the closed-session records of four 
licensing boards.  The records offered us significant insights into the boards’ decision-making 
processes, but also raised new concerns.  None of the records revealed the boards’ rationale for 
closing the cases brought by the citizens who complained to our office.  We found the boards 
spent little time and energy deliberating on each of the specific points raised by the complainants 
before dismissing them.  In short, the boards’ work product gave us little reason for confidence 
that the cases were given a careful and thorough look. 
 
We decided to engage in a full investigation of four 
licensing boards that had closed five different cases 
filed by citizens who had complained to our office.  
Each of our five investigations was conducted 
independently.  At the conclusion of each investigation, 
we issued our findings and recommendations to the four 
boards, and we received their replies.  This report is a 
consolidated summary of those five investigations.  
 
Disclaimer 
 
Because we discovered significant deficiencies that were common to some or all of the licensing 
boards whose actions we reviewed, we felt it was vitally important to inform the state’s 
policymakers and the public of our findings.  We believe at least some of the weaknesses we 
identified here are likely to exist with other state licensing boards.  However, Iowa law states that 
all licensing boards’ complaint files, reports, and information are privileged and confidential. 7  
Our statute empowers us to receive “information as necessary in the performance of the duties of 
the office,” but with the caveat that “confidential documents … shall continue to maintain their 
confidential status.” 8  Even though the law was recently changed to give us explicit access to the 
detailed minutes and audio recordings of closed-session meetings, we still are required to keep 
“any portion of the minutes or recording” confidential.9  For these reasons, presenting our full 
findings in a public report—even with redactions—posed a difficult challenge.   
  
In an effort to share our findings and safeguard confidentiality, we decided to issue a “special 
report” allowed by our regulatory authority.  The drawback of this special report is that we 
cannot identify the boards we investigated or the witnesses we interviewed.  However, the 
special report does allow us to disclose the problems we identified through witness testimony 
and our extensive review of agency records.  Our goal with this report is to raise awareness of 
procedural concerns and spur discussion on how licensing boards can be more accountable to the 
citizenry they are tasked to protect. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 See Iowa Code § 272C.6(4). 
8
 See Iowa Code § 2C.9(4). 
9
 See Iowa Code § 21.5(b)(2). 
In short, the boards’ work 
product gave us little reason 
for confidence that the cases 
were given a careful and 
thorough look. 
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Board Complaint-Handling Practices 
 
Each of the four boards whose work we examined follows a somewhat different process in how 
it receives and reviews complaints.  How those complaints are investigated and decided can also 
vary.  
 
In general, the boards we researched request that citizen complaints be in writing.  In some cases, 
a board’s executive director can reject a complaint without investigation and without any board 
involvement.  Other boards review and act on every complaint they receive, even if the 
complaint obviously lacks merit or falls outside their jurisdiction. 
 
Boards with sufficient resources often use their own investigators.  These investigators are 
usually former practitioners in the profession with extensive knowledge of the board they work 
for, but without investigative skills or experience.  Boards without their own investigators enlist 
the help of the Department of Inspections and Appeals, whose investigators have experience but 
may lack specialized knowledge of professions regulated by the boards.  
 
Sometimes, these investigators take direction from board staff on what records to request, whom 
to interview, and which avenues to explore.  In other cases, no specific directives are given.  
Some boards review their investigators’ reports and order further questions to be asked; others 
allow the investigators to dictate the scope of their work. 
 
Ultimately, the boards are responsible for deciding whether the information uncovered in an 
investigation is sufficient to proceed with formal charges against a licensee.  When a board 
decides not to seek formal action against a licensee under investigation, no discernible record of 
the decision is made public.  The complainant in such a case is usually told nothing substantive 
about the decision other than their complaint has been closed without further action. 
 
Findings of Fact  
 
Our investigation of four boards’ actions on five specific citizen complaints revealed some 
common problems in some or all of them. 
 
Incomplete Investigations 
 
It was not unusual for us to see a board’s investigator explore only a portion of the allegations 
submitted by a complainant.  This occurred even when a complaint contained multiple 
allegations that were clearly delineated, well organized, and documented with dates and details. 
 
When we asked one investigator how he chooses whom to interview, he said that he contacts the 
subject of the complaint and every party involved.  However, we found that the investigator 
failed to interview a licensee in one case, which led the board to issue a public statement of 
charges against the licensee.  The board later dismissed the charges when the licensee provided 
proof of her innocence.  By that time, the licensee’s name and the allegations against her were 
already made public, causing her humiliation and damaging her professional reputation.  When 
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we asked the investigator why he had not interviewed the licensee, he responded, “She wasn’t 
there at the time.” 
 
The investigator’s misstep was not merely careless—it was a violation of the board’s own 
regulations that require the board to give the subjects of a complaint an opportunity to explain or 
defend themselves before charges are publicly filed. 
 
Neither the board’s director, nor the board itself, had noticed the investigator’s omissions.  
Instead, the board decided to file charges against both licensees.  The board’s failure to demand a 
more thorough investigation before airing its accusations publicly left the licensee embittered. 
 
“I have had a clean license for 22 years and was really scared and unsettled by this whole 
situation,” the licensee told us. “My family and I should not have been placed in this difficult and 
unjust situation.” 
 
Another board failed to address all seven allegations 
enumerated by a complainant who claimed, in part, 
that a licensee had performed a more invasive 
procedure than what they had agreed to.    
 
Our investigation also found that the board and its 
executive director did not critically review the 
investigator’s report, even though the investigator 
failed to follow many of the board’s own directives.  
 
In a third case we reviewed, a board had issued a fine against a licensee for failing to notify 
customers of a business transaction as required by board regulations.  The investigator’s 
inadequate investigation in this case meant a second licensee involved in the transaction avoided 
any scrutiny or sanctions from the board. 
 
That investigator also took no action to investigate the complainant’s allegations that the second 
licensee failed to maintain proper oversight of confidential records in its possession, in violation 
of state and possibly federal law.  We asked the investigator what aspects of a complaint he 
chooses to pursue or decline.  He replied that he would not decline an issue raised in a complaint, 
even if he thought it was trivial.  “We have to investigate everything,” he said, “and trust me, 
there’s a lot of frivolity, but we’ve got to do it.”  When we asked specifically about the alleged 
violation related to the confidential records, the investigator said he did not believe there was a 
chance the violation had occurred, so he chose not to investigate it.  
 
Our investigation further found that there was no meaningful review of the investigator’s report 
by the executive director or the board.  Board officials confirmed to our office that the allegation 
might have constituted a violation of the board’s rules, if an investigation had been done and 
confirmed it. 
 
Conclusion:  We found examples in three of the five cases we reviewed where an investigator 
failed to conduct a reasonably thorough investigation by addressing each of the allegations raised 
“I have had a clean license for 
22 years and was really scared 
and unsettled by this whole 
situation,” the licensee told us. 
“My family and I should not 
have been placed in this 
difficult and unjust situation.” 
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in a complaint or following board directives.  Compounding this problem, board staff and board 
members have lacked critical oversight of their investigators’ work, and as a result, have 
overlooked important aspects of citizen complaints.    
 
Delegating the Boards’ Decision-Making Duties to Others 
 
Two of the boards we investigated rely heavily on committees comprised of a few board 
members to review citizen complaints and recommend whether they should be pursued further.  
The committees constitute less than a quorum of the full boards.  No minutes of their meetings 
were taken, no synopses of their investigations were offered, and there were no written 
explanations for the committees’ conclusions.  We found that the full boards engaged in very 
little debate on the merits of complaints and did little more than rubber-stamp their committees’ 
recommendations.    
 
In one case, the committee simply recommended closure of the case to the full board; no written 
synopsis of the investigation was offered, nor were there any written explanations for the 
committee’s conclusions.  When it came time for the full board to discuss the committee’s 
recommendations, there was no substantive discussion of the committee’s findings. 
 
We found a similar process at work with a second board that used an investigative committee to 
review the complaint.  No board member raised any questions about the particulars of the 
investigation or made any comments before they voted to close the case.  The complainant in the 
case received a generic form letter that simply stated the board had investigated the complaint 
and was unable to find any violations of Iowa law or administrative rules. 
 
In our review of a third board, we discovered late in our investigation that relevant records 
covered by our subpoena had not been provided to our office.  After identifying the missing 
records, the Attorney General’s office explained that its assistant assigned to the board had 
subpoenaed the records and never provided them to the board.  Only after we inquired about the 
records did the Attorney General’s office provide a copy of them to the board for its file, more 
than three years after the board had closed the case.  Clearly, the board could not have made an 
informed decision on the merits of the complaint without having access to relevant information. 
 
Conclusion:  Three of the five licensing boards we investigated were willing to blindly cede their 
decision-making authority to others, without demanding synopses of staff investigations or 
exchanging viewpoints.  The lack of any interactive discussion by board members displays an 
apathetic approach to vetting complaints. 
 
Poor Documentation of Board and Staff Deliberations 
 
It would have been impossible for us to understand the basis of these four boards’ decisions 
without reviewing their closed-session recordings and minutes.  That is because the boards keep 
few, if any, records that memorialize their discussions or explain the rationale for their decisions.  
Even after we received the boards’ closed-session records, they sometimes shed little light on the 
members’ decision-making.  For example: 
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 One board’s closed-session recording had somehow become damaged and was 
indiscernible. 
 One board destroyed a recording of one of its closed-session meetings, even though the 
case was still open and under consideration by the board.  Officials cited a one-year 
records-retention policy as the reason.   
 Another board informed us that its closed-session minutes were destroyed before its case 
was closed.  We later learned that the minutes were never created. 
 Two of the boards used investigative committees to evaluate citizen complaints.  These 
committees met separately from the full board and did not record their meetings or 
commit their discussions to a written record for the benefit of members or others. 
  
In several cases, we interviewed board members in an attempt to tap their recollections.  Some 
board members could not remember specifics on why they voted to close the cases, while others 
followed the assistant attorney general’s advice and refused to answer questions on what 
occurred in closed session.  
 
One board member with professional expertise gave some well-reasoned justifications for her 
feelings about a complaint, but admitted that she did not voice her reasoning during closed-
session meetings and did not know what other members of the board had based their decisions 
on.  No record of any board members’ rationale existed in closed-session minutes or in their 
explanation to the complainant. 
 
One board’s attorney who had participated in an investigative committee meeting told us that a 
court decision on a similar matter answered a pertinent legal question and justified closure of the 
complaint.  Although we understood the applicability of the legal precedent to the facts in the 
complaint, we learned that the case was not shared with the committee nor made part of the 
written record.  The attorney told us he did not believe the case was discussed among committee 
members.  If the committee and the board had not relied on the court case when it dismissed the 
complaint, it was unclear what basis the board had for its decision. 
 
Conclusion:  The four boards we investigated created no written record that explained the basis 
of their decisions; nor did their closed-session minutes or the recordings of their discussions offer 
any clarity.  The absence of documented proof that the complaints were properly considered 
raises questions about the integrity of their work. 
 
Conflicts of Interest 
 
Licensing boards in Iowa and across the country have come under fire in recent years from some 
analysts who believe such boards are more interested in safeguarding their livelihoods from 
outside competition than in regulating bad practitioners.  Some argue that the licensing and 
training requirements imposed by boards are unnecessarily daunting and dissuade new workers 
from entering their professions.
10
  One way to perpetuate these barriers, they say, is to load 
licensing boards with like-minded business partners and colleagues.  Said one legislative analyst: 
                                                 
10
 See Editorial, Iowa needs comprehensive job licensing review, D.M. Register, Jan. 24, 2017, available at 
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/editorials/2017/01/24/editorial-iowa-needs-comprehensive-job-
licensing-review/96975210/. 
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The dirty little secret about state licensure is that the people who lobby for it are 
usually the stronger competitors of those who would be licensed. Their goal is not 
to protect the public, but instead to raise barriers to new competitors who might 
cut prices and lower profits.
11
 
 
Nationally, it is common for licensing boards to consist primarily of professionals who are 
licensed by these same boards.  The stated reason for this model is to bring expertise to the table 
when complaints are brought; it is difficult for laypersons to know, for example, whether certain 
medications might cause dangerous side effects to patients with specific conditions.
12
  
 
While we believe this expertise is necessary for licensing boards to be effective, it also exposes 
boards to public accusations of self-dealing or protectionism when the target of a complaint is 
not disciplined.  This is especially the case when a board member is known to associate or work 
with a licensee under investigation. 
 
The Iowa Attorney General’s office has authored and distributed orientation materials to board 
members that address conflicts of interest and bias.  That material includes the Legal Overview 
for New Board and Commission Members, which states that board members are required to 
provide “unbiased, fair treatment—free from improper influences of family, social, political, and 
other relationships, or prejudgment of the facts.”  Cases where obvious conflicts would arise 
include spouses, siblings, close friends, or work colleagues. 
 
The Governor’s New Board and Commission Members’ Orientation also provides guidance on 
how members should approach conflicts of interest: 
 
Although not required by statute, you should refrain from taking any official 
action or performing any official duty in any matter where your objectivity or 
impartiality could reasonably be questioned. 
 
When a board member has an obvious conflict of interest—or where there is even a perception of 
a conflict of interest—he or she is typically advised to remove him or herself not only from 
voting, but also discussion on the matter, so as not to influence other board members either 
directly or indirectly.  The conflict should also be stated for the record so that no one can accuse 
the board of hiding the fact. 
 
Two of the boards whose decisions we reviewed faced accusations of conflicts of interest.  In 
both cases, we believe the complainants’ concerns were valid and were inadequately addressed 
by the boards. 
 
In the first case, we were informed that a board member was working for the licensee that was 
the subject of a complaint.  When we interviewed that board member under oath and asked her 
                                                 
11
 Jack P. McHugh, “We’re All Licensees Now,” Mackinac Center for Public Policy, July 24, 2003, 
http://www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=5570. 
12
 Many of Iowa’s licensing boards are required to have a number of public members in addition to licensed 
members, although the public members make up a minority of the full board. 
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whether she had participated in any closed-door discussions about the licensee under 
investigation, she assured us that she had removed herself from those discussions. 
 
“[I]n this particular case,” the board member told us, “because I felt like my presence might be 
construed as a bias and there might be a suspicion of impropriety, I recused myself.”  Closed-
session records revealed otherwise. 
 
In addition, we found a second member of the same board who had recently worked for the 
licensee under investigation.  This board member took part in all of the meetings on the subject 
during his time on the board.  Based on the information he provided, the board member was 
employed by the licensee for many years and may have still been working there when the 
complaint was filed.  We asked him about the negative perception this might have for the 
complainant: 
 
Ombudsman:  Can you understand why that would bother them? 
Board Member:  I can understand why it would bother some people. 
Ombudsman:  Okay.  But that’s not enough for you to change your action? 
Board Member:  I did not take myself out of the voting.  No, that would not be 
enough to change my opinion. 
 
In another case we investigated, the chairman of the board was the person accused of 
wrongdoing.  Although the chairman stepped out of all the meetings relating to the complaint 
against him, we questioned whether other members of the board could consider the complaint 
fairly since they had worked side-by-side with him.  One board member we interviewed who 
served alongside the chairman and was a practitioner in the profession acknowledged that the 
chairman was “a colleague” and “a peer” with whom the board member consorted at professional 
events.  Regardless, the board member did not believe a conflict of interest existed.  The board 
member said the board was conscious of the potential perception of a conflict when they 
deliberated and called for an outside investigator to mitigate the perception.  However, we could 
find no evidence in the record indicating that the board raised the subject of the conflict, or that it 
had such a concern in mind then they brought in the investigator.    
 
Conclusion:  The three board members who had professional relationships with the licensees 
under their boards’ investigation should have recused themselves from all discussions on the 
cases since their participation created, at a minimum, an appearance of a conflict of interest.  
When it is known that a board member has had a relationship with a licensee under investigation, 
participating in that investigation understandably erodes the public’s trust and faith in the system.  
It is plausible that these board members’ participation in the meetings could have influenced 
other board members to vote with them.  Additionally, in the second case, we believe that the 
entire board should have recognized the perception created by their oversight of a fellow board 
member and taken steps to address the conflict. 
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Unprofessional Behavior 
 
It is unfortunate that we cannot share statements made in closed session by the members of one 
board.  A variety of remarks made in a pair of meetings were derogatory, inappropriate, and 
quite frankly, appalling.  While the statements were 
made in the privacy of closed-session meetings, they 
were not harmless.  The remarks suggest that at least 
some of the board members may have been biased 
against the complainants and certain licensees.  That 
bias may have had an effect on the board members’ 
ultimate decisions.  
 
Conclusion:  One of Iowa’s licensing boards made gratuitous and unwarranted statements about 
complainants whose cases they should have evaluated solely on their merits.  The remarks signal 
a potential bias on the part of some board members, and do damage to their credibility as 
impartial and serious arbiters of legitimate public complaints.  
 
Uninformative Closing Letters 
 
This was the full explanation one of our complainants received from a board’s executive 
director, by email, on the board’s decision to close her complaint: 
 
The Board has ended its investigation and closed the matter, with no further 
action to be taken.  This was done in consultation with the Iowa Attorney 
General’s office, during this week’s board meeting. 
 
Our complainant was apoplectic.  “No further action like hell,” she replied.   “… You haven’t 
done anything.” 
 
We found that short and simple responses to complainants are the norm for the boards we 
investigated—if a response is offered at all.   
 
A complainant to a different board told us he was 
“amazed” and “baffled” when he learned that his 
allegations against a licensed professional were 
closed without further action.  He believed the 
facts he provided to the board were clear-cut 
evidence of a violation.  Nevertheless, the board 
left him with no explanation on how they had 
reached their conclusion.  “I’m beyond disappointed in an agency that I once felt upheld the 
integrity of this profession,” the complainant told us.  
 
Another board’s uninformative, four-sentence closing letter invited a complainant to contact the 
board’s executive officer if he had any questions.  The executive officer later admitted to us that 
he would not have been able to provide additional information on the case if the complainant had 
called.  “I only answer general questions about the board’s disciplinary process,” he told us. 
A variety of remarks made in a 
pair of meetings were 
derogatory, inappropriate, and 
quite frankly, appalling. 
We found that short and simple 
responses to complainants are the 
norm for the boards we 
investigated—if a response is 
offered at all. 
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When we questioned the need for such secrecy, officials claimed that any public 
acknowledgement of an unfounded complaint could do damage to the licensee’s reputation. 
Indeed, state law considers many of the records the boards review and produce confidential.   
The particulars of board discussions on investigations also are protected from disclosure, since 
they happen almost exclusively in closed-session meetings.   
 
This means that people who file complaints in the genuine belief that they were wronged never 
learn the basis of a board’s dismissal.  They also receive no assurance that each of their 
allegations was considered, or how thoroughly.   
 
It is understandable, then, why complainants have appealed to our office for answers.  
Interestingly, licensing boards have not always been so restrictive in their closing 
communications with complainants.   
 
In 2001, the Iowa Supreme Court ordered a licensing board, the Iowa Board of Educational 
Examiners (BOEE), to provide a better explanation on one of its decisions.
13
  The BOEE had 
issued what amounted to a two-paragraph form letter that merely told the complainant there was 
“insufficient evidence” to support a hearing into the allegations. 
 
The Court, citing the BOEE’s own administrative rules and federal court precedent, found that 
the board “should have furnished a statement of reasons for its refusal to act that was more 
specific than its mere declaration that no probable cause was established.”  The Court reasoned 
that it would be difficult for any court to review the correctness of the BOEE’s decision without 
a fuller explanation: 
 
[T]he board should be free to exercise its discretion and expertise without 
interference from the courts.  These powers must, however, be exercised in a 
manner that is not arbitrary or capricious, and a court must be satisfied that is the 
case.  The court can only make that determination if the board’s statement of 
reasons provides the necessary information as to how the agency power was 
exercised.
14
 
 
In the ensuing two years, the BOEE offered the complainant expanded explanations that were 
twice rejected by a district court as insufficient.  The fourth version of the decision, which totaled 
15 pages, finally passed court muster in 2003. 
 
Ironically, the long-term result of that Iowa Supreme Court decision was less accountability, not 
more.  Immediately after the Court’s decision, the Legislature amended Iowa law to prohibit the 
courts from reviewing licensing board decisions when the boards dismiss a case.
15
   
 
That leaves citizens with no options for appeal when they want to know why their complaint to a 
state licensing board led nowhere.   
 
                                                 
13
 Lewis Central Educ. Ass’n v. Iowa Bd. Of Educational Examiners, 625 N.W.2d 687 (2001). 
14
 Lewis Central, 625 N.W.2d at 693. 
15
 See Iowa Code § 272C.3(1)(d). 
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One licensing board that has committed to providing detailed explanations of its work is the 
Iowa Attorney Disciplinary Board (ADB).  The ADB, which is governed by court rules 
established by the Judicial Branch, has a grievance process generally similar to that of other 
licensing boards.  Unlike licensing boards governed by Iowa Code chapter 272C, the ADB is 
obligated under court rules to inform the complainant in writing if a complaint is dismissed.
16
  
Sample ADB dismissal letters we reviewed included details specific to the complaints and the 
facts of the cases.  These explanations are given despite ADB rules that deem its files 
confidential.
17
 
 
Licensing boards are authorized to sanction licensees with a letter of education or a written 
administrative warning, both of which are considered private actions.  Informing complainants of 
such private actions, one assistant attorney general told us, would violate the licensees’ due-
process rights because licensees are not afforded a hearing.  It is noteworthy that the ADB also is 
empowered to issue private admonitions without a hearing, but still “must notify the complainant 
of the board’s opinion concerning the matter and its communication with the attorney 
involved.”18  
 
Conclusion:  The four licensing boards we investigated are overly strict in their judgment that 
secrecy in their decisions must prevail.  Without some transparency, complainants cannot 
understand the basis for the boards’ decision to dismiss a complaint.  This culture of secrecy 
breeds public distrust, resentment, and a lack of confidence in a system intended to assure the 
public that professionals are being held to a high standard.  While it is certainly important to 
preserve the reputations of professionals who have not committed rule violations, it is equally 
important for the public to have confidence that their complaints were earnestly and thoroughly 
investigated.  We believe that licensing boards can and should provide more substantive 
explanations in their closing communications with complainants to ensure public confidence in 
the process, and to validate licensees who conduct themselves properly.  
  
                                                 
16
 See Iowa Rules of Court:  
Rule 35.5 “Upon receipt of any complaint, the disciplinary board must notify the complainant in writing 
that the board has received the complaint and will act upon it or that pursuant to rule 35.4(1) the board will 
take no action on the complaint.”;  
Rule 35.8(1) “Upon receipt of a response, the disciplinary board must do one of the following: (a) Dismiss 
the complaint and notify the complainant and the respondent of the dismissal in writing”;  
Rule 35.9(1) “When the report and recommendation of the investigator is returned to the disciplinary board, 
the board must do one of the following: Dismiss the complaint and notify the complainant and the 
respondent of the dismissal.” 
17
 See Iowa Rules of Court, Rule 35.4(3). 
18
 See Iowa Rules of Court, Rule 35.11(3). 
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Summary and Conclusions  
 
When we began to receive the complaints profiled in this report, we had no reason to believe that 
the licensing boards’ decisions would not be reasonable and well-founded.  But when we asked 
to see the boards’ work, we were met with a wall of secrecy that took more than three years to 
penetrate.   
 
Once the Legislature gave us the explicit authority to review records of the boards’ closed-
session meetings that are so integral to their work, we were surprised by what we saw:  
lackadaisical investigations, apathetic board members, poor documentation of deliberations, and 
questionable outcomes.  Even though we exhausted our ability to investigate these cases, it is 
still inexplicable why some of them were dismissed with no action.   
 
We believe that the citizens who filed the complaints referenced in this report deserved better:  
more complete investigations, more engaged discussions by the boards, and more detailed 
explanations for how their cases were handled.  We wanted our complainants to have comfort 
that their allegations were taken seriously and the decisions made in their cases were justified.  In 
truth, our complainants had none of that.  They still don’t.  
 
This causes us to ponder whether the shortcomings in this small handful of cases might be 
symptomatic of broader problems.  Is it possible that Iowa’s licensing boards, through their less-
than-vigorous work, might be failing to protect the public at large from troublesome 
practitioners? 
 
We strongly believe that the environment in which these boards have been allowed to exist—
behind closed doors—has fostered uninspired work and unprofessional conduct.  It has been easy 
for these boards to do less than their best because, for years, no one has been in a position to 
evaluate their work.  In short, it has been a system unaccountable.   
 
It is our opinion that all of Iowa’s licensing boards, perhaps with guidance from the Legislature, 
must find a way to be transparent, in the interest of maintaining a system that patients, clients, 
and professionals can have confidence in.  We encourage board administrators to begin speaking 
with their boards and with lawmakers about how to accomplish that.   
 
Recommendations and Responses 
 
The findings in our investigations led us to make 20 recommendations among the four licensing 
boards.  Almost all of our recommendations called for systemic improvements to the boards’ 
practices or policies.  Because we identified some common problems among the boards, several 
of our recommendations were made to more than one board.  
 
We recommended in three of our reports that the boards commit to more critical reviews of their 
staffs’ investigations, to ensure that complaints are thoroughly examined and all aspects of a 
complaint are considered.   
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One of the responding boards—the one which had failed to investigate five of the seven 
allegations raised by a complainant—promised to “take a more active and comprehensive role in 
directing and overseeing [its] investigations.”  A 
single member of that board, responding separately 
to our office, acknowledged that the investigation in 
the case we scrutinized was less than ideal.  “A quick 
look at the barely legible notes of the investigation 
reveals no organized approach to the interviews,” he 
said.  “A Board cannot expect a complete, accurate, 
and useable report if we do not first request one.” 
 
Another board, which had conducted no review of a significant aspect of a complaint, was more 
tepid in its response:  “The Board understands that it has the authority and discretion to request 
further investigation.  The Board has and will continue to exercise this authority where it 
believes appropriate.”  We also recommended to this board that it interview all people who might 
have relevant information about a complaint.  We found that this board had publicly filed 
charges against a licensee without ever speaking with her, despite a board rule that required 
outreach to the licensee before charges were filed.  The board admitted fault and promised to 
follow the rule and adopt a policy to ensure the error would not be repeated. 
 
That board declined, however, to review documents that its attorney had subpoenaed and 
examined but had withheld from the board.  The board acknowledged that there may have been 
some procedural irregularities in the investigation, but based on the amount of time that had 
passed, did “not feel that devoting additional time and resources is a good use of our already 
limited time and resources.” 
 
Recording Investigative Committee Meetings 
 
Two boards balked at our recommendations that they begin recording investigative committee 
discussions so the basis of the committees’ decisions could be better understood.   
 
One of the boards suggested that taking minutes of its committee’s discussions for others’ benefit 
“would have a chilling effect on necessary free, thorough, and frank participation.”  That board 
also maintained that its committee discussions were adequately summarized for other board 
members, when it was clear from our investigation that they were not.  The second board said it 
would “endeavor to keep more detailed notes” of its committee discussions “in case questions 
should arise from its work.”   
 
In the case of these two boards, we also recommended that all of their members take a more 
active role in evaluating their committees’ findings to ensure that a variety of perspectives would 
lead to the best decisions.  The first board suggested that its members could decide for 
themselves whether to take an active interest in the purported misbehavior of licensees.  The 
board’s executive officer said that “each board member would be reminded to thoroughly review 
each complaint … and participate” in discussions.  The second board assured us that its board 
members know it is their job—not the committee’s—to decide disciplinary cases.  
 
“A Board cannot expect a 
complete, accurate, and 
useable report if we do not first 
request one.” – member of a 
licensing board 
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Conflicts of Interest 
 
Two boards agreed with our recommendation to be more sensitive in situations where their 
members may have personal or professional relationships with licensees under investigation.  
Training materials from the Attorney General’s and Governor’s offices suggest that board 
members remove themselves from discussions and abstain from voting when their independence 
could reasonably be questioned.   
 
One board, although it disputed our report’s finding that two of its members had improperly 
participated in board discussions, still pledged to add a conflicts-of-interest section to its annual 
training session.   
 
The second board claimed it already met the goals spelled out in the training materials, but 
would “try to be more transparent when potential conflicts of interest are involved.”  The board, 
which had decided a complaint against its chairman in his favor, declined our recommendation to 
consider outsourcing such decisions in the future, to avoid any hint that the board might be apt to 
protect one of its own.  The board argued that the current law does not allow complaints to be 
handled by others.  It also placed importance on its specialized expertise and consistency in 
decision-making.  “We do not feel that allowing another board to decide complaints against a 
licensee is wise,” the board said.  It did, however, say it would consider asking peer reviewers to 
offer input in future such cases. 
 
Professional Decorum 
 
We recommended that one board maintain professionalism during its closed-session meetings 
after we found two separate instances where board members and staff made disparaging remarks 
about complainants and licensees.  The board agreed to this recommendation, stating that it 
strives to treat all Iowans “with respect and civility.” 
 
Closing Communications to Complainants 
 
Our most commonly issued recommendation—that the boards provide more substantive 
explanations of their decisions to complainants—received only minimal commitments from most 
of the boards.  Each board argued in its own way that state law strictly limits its ability to justify 
its decisions with details.   
 
“[T]he Board is statutorily constrained and cannot give ‘investigative information’ relating to 
licensee discipline to a complainant, in a letter closing the investigation, or otherwise,” one board 
said.  “… [T]he Board has a duty to protect the [reputation of the licensee] as well as the 
complainant.” 
 
One board said it would consider creating a pamphlet for the public to better understand its 
complaint-taking processes.  But it gave no ground on its past practice of issuing what essentially 
are form letters. 
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A different board took the curious position that it “neither accepts nor rejects” our 
recommendation.  “The Board agrees that it should provide an explanation to complainants to the 
extent permitted by law.” But it added, “The Board does not believe that the amount of 
information contemplated by your recommendation is consistent with Iowa law.” 
 
One board implied that it had no responsibility to explain its actions to complainants:  “Our 
mission as a public health board is to protect the public from incompetent or unethical licensees,” 
the board said, “… not to provide individualized resolution to a complaint.” 
 
Only one board acknowledged complainants’ frustration with uninformative letters, and 
the effect that secrecy has on the public’s confidence:   
 
The [board] recognizes that this statutory limitation on its ability to share 
investigative findings can lead to frustration among some complainants.  You 
correctly note that a lack of transparency can undermine confidence in a licensing 
board’s disciplinary decisions.   
 
The board informed us that it would explore ways to update and expand its closing letters to 
provide more information to complainants on the scope of its disciplinary authority and its 
decision-making processes while maintaining the confidentiality of its investigative files. 
 
Some Improvements Underway 
 
Since issuing the reports to the four boards, at least one 
of them is taking our concerns to heart.  A member of 
that board reported that he and his colleagues are 
already requesting more investigative information on complaints.  They also are discussing 
specific reasons for closing cases that may be shared with complainants.  He added that the 
Attorney General has promised a presentation on conflicts of interest.  In an email to our office, 
the board member wrote: “This was THE best meeting I attended in three years.  Thank you for 
your efforts.” 
 
A Final Note 
 
A government agency that purports to exist for the benefit of the public but refuses to explain its 
work invites deep suspicion and distrust.  Such is the case with Iowa’s licensing boards, which 
have displayed an obvious preference for secrecy over transparency.  The boards we investigated 
have argued that state law ties their hands and requires them to safeguard all the findings of their 
inquiries and deliberations, regardless of any sympathies they may have for complainants.   
 
For some boards, we are not convinced that is their main motivation.  Two different board 
officials told us they stopped sending automatic closing letters to complainants because it was 
inconvenient.   “The letters took time to write,” one director told us, “and it would almost be 
counterproductive because the complainant then would be unhappy.  It would be unsettling for 
them to know that the board had reviewed it and not taken any action.”  
 
“This was THE best meeting I 
attended in three years.  Thank 
you for your efforts.”  
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Some of the boards have a history of hiding their deliberations from outside eyes.  In a litigation 
action spanning from 1998 to 2003, one board had to be instructed three times to comply with a 
court order to explain to a complainant why it dismissed a case.  In the midst of litigation, the 
board amended its statute to shield investigative records that were previously accessible to the 
public.  Also during this time, the Legislature was persuaded to pass a law to preclude judges 
from reviewing decisions of other licensing boards whenever a case is dismissed. 
 
We acknowledge that providing closing explanations to complainants can be burdensome.  We 
can attest that providing explanations to our 4,000 complainants each year takes time and 
resources.  This is especially true in the handful of cases when complainants do not readily 
accept our decisions.  It also can be difficult for us to balance responsiveness with our obligation 
to maintain the confidentiality of sensitive information.  However, we consider this 
responsiveness not only our legal obligation, but a moral one.  Citizens must have faith in the 
government that affects their lives, and this accountability is a small price to pay.  Otherwise, “a 
body of men holding themselves accountable to nobody ought not to be trusted by anybody.”19   
 
Through the Legislature’s actions in 2015, lawmakers recognized the need for licensing boards 
to be more accountable.  Our office now has access to closed-session records, which should help 
provide much-needed oversight of the licensing boards’ work.  But we still are unable to share 
particulars from the boards’ investigations, leaving the public with little choice but to blindly 
trust our judgments. 
 
In light of the culture of secrecy long employed by the licensing boards, we believe that 
policymakers and agency officials should consider whether a change in their processes is 
warranted.  We are not making a specific legislative recommendation at this time, as we 
recognize there may be valid policy arguments for and against opening licensing board records.  
There may be no easy consensus on balancing licensees’ desire for privacy with the public’s 
right to know.  
 
Regardless of how it is done, we believe it is imperative that the state’s licensing boards be more 
accountable to the public they serve.  More transparency is the only way to instill confidence in 
the important decisions these boards make.  
                                                 
19
 Thomas Paine, “The Rights of Man: Being an Answer to Mr. Burke’s Attack on the French Revolution,” 1791. 
http://www.ushistory.org/paine/rights/index.htm (last visited February 1, 2017.) 
